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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey year, Illinois courts refined established
commercial law principles. Cases discussed in this article concern
the following topics: business associations,' securities regulation,
commercial transactions, 3 contracts, 4 and consumer protection. 5
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*
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1. See infra notes 9-47 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 64-97 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 98-218 and accompanying text.
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This article will describe also the amendments made by the Illinois
Legislature to the Business Corporation Act of 1983,6 the Uniform
Commercial Code (the "U.C.C."), and the Illinois Banking Act.8

II.

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS

A. Agency
The Illinois Supreme Court decided one important case in the
area of agency law during the Survey year. In Martin v. Heinold
Commodities, Inc.,9 the court considered a broker's duty to disclose accurately the sources and amount of brokerage commissions
to prospective customers.10 The court did not treat the issue as a
legal question concerning the materiality of the information. Instead, the court held that a broker has, with limited exceptions, no
duty to disclose the amount of brokerage fees prior to the actual
creation of an agency relationship with the customer."
In Martin, the plaintiff (the "purchaser") purchased securities
from defendant Heinold Commodities, Inc. (the "broker"), pursuant to a written customer agreement.' 2 The agreement failed to
disclose that a significant portion of the brokerage fee constituted
additional sales commissions.1 3 In addition, prior to the purchaser's accepting the agreement, the broker misled the purchaser
about the purpose of the fee.1 4 The purchaser argued that the
amount of the brokerage fee was material to his decision whether
to invest, and that the broker's failure to disclose this information,
therefore, constituted a breach of his fiduciary duty as a matter of
law. The broker maintained that it had no duty to fully disclose the
amount of its fees prior to the creation of the agency relationship.15
The court rejected the materiality analysis proffered by the
5.
6.
7.
8.

See
See
See
See

9.

117 Ill. 2d 67, 510 N.E.2d 840 (1987).

10.
11.
12.

infra
infra
infra
infra

notes
notes
notes
notes

219-48
249-50
251-55
256-64

and
and
and
and

accompanying
accompanying
accompanying
accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.

Id. at 80, 510 N.E.2d at 845-46.
Id.
Id. at 70, 510 N.E.2d at 841. The plaintiff purchaser brought a class action on

behalf of similarly situated securities purchasers. Id.
13.

Id. at 75, 510 N.E.2d at 843. According to the agreements, the fee would cover

the costs of telephone, telex, bookkeeping, floor brokerage, clearing fees, research costs,
and compensating defendant's representatives. Id. at 73, 510 N.E.2d at 842.
14.
15.

I
Id.

i-t

.

75, 510 N.E.2d at 843.
76, 510 N.E.2d at 844. Apparently, the broker never disclosed the full

amount of its commission after it had created the agency relationship by accepting an
executed copy of the customer agreement. Id. at 75, 510 N.E.2d at 843.
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plaintiff.' 6 Instead, it relied upon the rule that an agent has no
duty to disclose the terms of its compensation prior to the creation
of a fiduciary relationship with a principal. 17 The court recognized
two exceptions to this rule.' 8 First, a prospective agent may have a
duty to disclose the terms of its compensation prior to the formal
establishment of an agency relationship if the agent is acting as an
agent-in-fact when the compensation issue arose.' 9 Second, when
the fiduciary relationship is one of special trust and confidence, the
prospective agent may have a duty to disclose the terms of his employment. 20 Thus, the court remanded the action to allow the
buyer to prove that one of the exceptions applied. 2'
A strong argument can be made that Heinhold was wrongly decided. As Justice Simon recognized in his dissent, "(t]he fiduciary
relationship does not permit a fiduciary to mislead someone, become his agent, and then allow his principal to labor under the
misimpression caused by the fiduciary's own previous statements."' 22 The fiduciary's duty to disclose information should be
based on the materiality of the information to the principal, and
not on whether the information becomes relevant before or after
the agent relationship is created.
The Heinold court's reliance on the timing of the agency rela16. Id. at 78, 510 N.E.2d at 845.
17. Martin, 117 111. 2d at 78, 510 N.E.2d at 845.
18. Id. at 7-79, 510 N.E.2d at 845 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 390 comment e (1958); Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 824
(10th Cir. 1986); Greenwood v. Dittmer, 776 F.2d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 1985)).
19. Martin, 117 Il.2d at 78-79, 510 N.E.2d at 845. The court noted, for example,
that the broker already may have been acting on the purchaser's behalf prior to the execution of the customer's agreement. Id. at 79, 510 N.E.2d at 845.
20. Id. at 79, 510 N.E.2d at 845.
21. Id. at 80, 510 N.E.2d at 846. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court and remanded the case for reconsideration of whether the certification of the class
was necessary. Id. at 83, 510 N.E.2d at 847. The plaintiff also alleged violations of the
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. Id. at 71, 510 N.E.2d at 841.
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 261-272 (1985). These claims, however, were not
a part of the summary judgment motion and, therefore, were not before the Illinois
Supreme Court. For a discussion of the purpose and application of the Act, see the
Consumer Protection section of this Article, infra notes 219-48 and accompanying text.
22. Id. at 86, 510 N.E.2d at 848 (Simon, J. dissenting). In his dissenting oninicA,
Justice Simon focused on the materiality of the compensation information rather than the
timing of the agency relationship. Id. at 83, 510 N.E.2d at 847 (Simon, J. dissenting).
Justice Simon argued that the commission 'kick-backs' constituted a breach of fiduciary
duty. Id. at 88, 510 N.E.2d at 849. According to Justice Simon, the purchaser would
have been influenced in his investment decision had he known of the concealed commissions. Id. at 87, 510 N.E.2d at 849. Thus, Justice Simon concluded that the fee distribution was a material fact requiring disclosure and that the defendant breached its fiduciary
duty by failing to disclose that material fact. Id. at 88, 510 N.E.2d at 849.
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tionship as the touchstone of the broker's duty imposes a major
problem of proof on plaintiffs. The court placed on plaintiffs the
difficult burden of showing the applicability of one of the exceptions to the rule that there is no duty to disclose material information prior to the creation of the agency relationship. In contrast,
materiality can often be determined as a matter of law. Perhaps
more disturbing about Heinhold is the court's refusal to place on
the agent the duty to cure misrepresentations made during the preagency period. This suggests that brokers (and other agents) can
shield themselves from liability by marshalling their misrepresentations in the pre-agency period. Heinhold is inconsistent with the
court's solicitude for investors in other contexts.23 Its reach should
be limited by the court or the legislature.
B.

Corporations

Appellate courts decided several important corporate issues during the Survey year. In Brown v. Tenney, a case of first impression in Illinois, the Appellate Court for the First District rejected
the approach of the Delaware, New York, and California courts,
and recognized a "A.ouble derivative" cause of action.25
In Tenney, the plaintiff Brown was a shareholder of T/B Holding Company, which owned all the stock of Pioneer Commodities,
Inc. The defendants Tenney, Jell, and Agricon, Inc. operated Pioneer. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty by wasting, diverting, and damaging the assets of
Pioneer.26
In order to recognize a double derivative action, the appellate
court relaxed the contemporaneous ownership requirement that an
individual bringing a derivative action against a corporation must
be a shareholder of that corporation at the time of the alleged
wrong.27 According to the court, states that refused to recognize
23. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Cablevision Programming Inv., 114 Ill. 2d 150, 162-63, ,99
N.E.2d 1309, 1315 (1986). See the Securities Regulation section of this article, infra
notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
24. 155 Il. App. 3d 605, 608-09, 508 N.E.2d 347, 349-50 (1st Dist. 1987), cerL
granted, - Ill. 2d -, 515 N.E.2d 102 (1987).

25.

A double derivative action is one in which a shareholder of a parent or holding

corporation seeks to enforce derivatively the corporation's derivative right to sue on behalf of the subsidiary corporation. Id. at 607, 508 N.E.2d at 349 (citing Note, Suits by a
Shareholder in a ParentCorporationto Redress Injuries to the Subsidiary, 64 HARV. L.

REv. 1313 (1951); 19 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations§ 2253 (1986); Birch v. McColgan, 39 F.
Supp. 358, 366 (S.D. Cal. 1941)).
26. Tenney, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 606, 508 N.E.2d at 348.
27. Id. at 608, 508 N.E.2d at 350. Contemporaneous ownership is a requirement of
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double derivative actions strictly adhered to the contemporaneous
ownership requirement. 28 The Tenney court, however, adopted the
approach of the courts that have relaxed the contemporaneous
ownership requirement and allowed double derivative actions.29
The court surveyed, with approval, the theoretical and practical
bases relied upon by courts that have recognized double derivative
actions. 30 For example, some courts have analogized double derivative actions to suits for specific performance of the holding company's duty to use its control of a subsidiary to right any wrong to
that subsidiary.
Other courts have treated a double derivative
action as a suit by a beneficiary of the fiduciary's duty to protect
the subsidiary. 32 Some courts have allowed double derivative actions when the same individuals controlled the holding and subsidiary corporations, in effect piercing the corporate veil of the
subsidiary.33 Courts have held also that shareholders of a parent
corporation have standing to sue derivatively for wrongs to a subsidiary because harm to the subsidiary will diminish the value of
the parent corporation's shares.34
Tenny is a salutory decision. The court was correct that rigid
adherence to the contemporaneous ownership requirement is illadvised, at least in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. 35
Double derivative actions will help ensure that shareholders can
protect themselves against wrongful actions that directly decrease
the value of their investment. One question left unanswered by
Tenny is whether double derivative actions can be maintained if
not all of the stock of the subsidiary is held by the parent corporathe majority of states for standing in derivative actions; the requirement in Illinois is
statutory. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 1058 (1983); Business Corporation Act of 1983, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.80(a) (1985).
28. Tenney, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 608, 508 N.E.2d at 349-50 (citing Busch v. Mary A.
Riddle Co., 283 F. 443 (D.C. Del. 1922); Sabre v. United Traction & Elec. Co., 225 F.
601 (D.C.R.I. 1915); Sheehan v. Municipal Light & Power Co., 54 F. Supp. 169
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 151 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1945); Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 173 Cal.
App. 3d 410, 219 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1985); Schneider v. Greater M. & S. Circuit, 259 N.Y.S.
319, 144 Misc. 534, 236 App. Div. 582 (1932)).
29. Id. at 608, 508 N.E.2d at 350 (citing Note, Suits By a Shareholder in a Parent
Corporation to Redress Injuries to the Subsidiary, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1313-14 (1951)).
30. Id. at 609, 508 N.E.2d at 350.
31. Id. (citing 13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 5977 (1984)).
32. Id. (citing Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944)).
33. Id. (citing United States Lines, Inc. v. United States Lines Co., 96 F.2d 148 (2d
Cir. 1938); Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 54 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Penn.
1944)).
34. Id. (citing 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations§ 2349 (1986)).

35.

Id.
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tion. In that case, other shareholders of the subsidiary might be
expected to protect their own interests, obviating the need for a
double derivative action. On the other hand, vigilant shareholders
of the parent corporation should not be left without a remedy for
wrongdoing by a subsidiary that directly threatens their investment
in the parent corporation.
In Geri's West Inc. v. Ferrall,36 the Appellate Court for the Second District held that an individual acting on behalf of a corporate
franchiser is not shielded by the corporate form of the franchiser,
and can be personally liable for violations of the Franchise Disclosure Act (the "Act"). 37 The plaintiff, Geri's West Incorporated
(the "franchisee"), purchased a restaurant franchise from the corporate franchiser, Geri Corporation (the "franchiser"). Defendant
Ferrall, the president of the franchiser (the "corporation president"), represented the franchiser and handled the sale negotiations. Neither the corporation president nor any other Geri
Corporation representative registered or properly disclosed the
franchise sale as required by the Act. 38 The franchisee sought
damages, or, alternatively, rescission of the franchise agreement for
the corporation president's violation of the Act.39
The appellate court held that employees of corporate franchisers
can be personally liable for violations of the Act, so long as they
acted as a "franchise broker," "salesperson," or "other person" in
connection with the sale of a franchise. ° According to the court,
the legislature's application of the Act to noncorporate parties "evidence[s] a clear, comprehensive strategy of individual liability for
all those acting for a franchiser and guilty of some wrongdoing
under the Act."' 4' The court thus held that the corporation presi36. 153 Ill. App. 3d 579, 505 N.E.2d 1348 (2d Dist. 1987).
37. Id. at 581-83, 505 N.E.2d at 1350-51. The purpose of the Franchise Disclosure
Act is to protect Illinois resident franchisees by requiring disclosure of information neces-

sary to make an intelligent decision regarding a franchise purchase. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch.

121 1/2, para. 701-40 (1985).
38. Ferrall, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 581, 505 N.E.2d at 1349.

39. Id. at 581, 505 N.E.2d at 1349-50. The issue of Ferrall's personal liability was
especially important because the corporate franchiser had declared bankruptcy. id. at
581, 505 N.E.2d at 1349.
40. Id. at 583, 505 N.E.2d at 1351. The appellate court also reversed the trial court's

finding that the franchisee failed to give proper notice of its intention to rescind the agreement. Id. at 585, 505 N.E.2d at 1352.
41. Id. at 583, 505 N.E.2d at 1350. Section 4 of the Act provides that it is unlawful

for any "person" to fail to register or to fail to provide proper disclosure concerning any
franchise offer or sale. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 704 (1985). Section 3(7) of the
Act defines "person" as meaning an "individual, a corporation, a partnership, a joint

venture, an association, a joint stock company, a trust, or an unincorporated organization." Id. at para. 703 (1985).
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dent could be personally liable because he acted as a franchise broker or sales person by selling the franchise to the plaintiff.42
The Ferrallcourt's expansive reading of the Act is suspect. Nowhere did the court point to statutory language suggesting that the
legislature sought to radically broaden the liability of corporate
employees for acts done on behalf of the corporation. That the Act
also applies to noncorporate parties suggests no more than a legislative recognition that not all the participants in the sale of a
franchise may be corporations.
In Behrstock v. Ace Hose and Rubber Co.,43 the Appellate Court
for the First District held that a fifty percent co-owner of a corporation did not have the express or implied power to raise the salary
of an employee over the repeated objections of the other coowner." The case arose when the plaintiff co-owner objected to an
employment contract that the defendant co-owner executed on behalf of the company. 45 The court rejected defendant's contention
that a fifty percent co-owner has the implied authority to bind the
corporation over the objection of the other co-owner."
Although the Behrstock decision is unremarkable as a matter of
law, it does illustrate the uncertainty and risks inherent when there
is fifty percent co-ownership of a corporation. These problems extend to others wh, nter into an agreement with only one of the
fifty percent co-owners. In Behrstock, for example, the employee
was forced to return salary and bonuses he received under the employment contract to which one co-owner objected.47
III. SECURITIES REGULATION
The Illinois Supreme Court considered the reach of the Illinois
securities laws in Benjamin v. Cablevision Programming Investments.4 The court held that, in certain circumstances, the sale of
securities to out-of-state residents could be a "sale in this state"
subject to registration under section 5 of the Illinois Securities Law
("the Act"). 9 The court further held, however, that the limited42. Ferrall,153 Ill. App. 3d at 583, 505 N.E.2d at 1351.
43. 147 Ill. App. 3d 76, 496 N.E.2d 1024 (1st Dist. 1986).
44. Id. at 81, 496 N.E.2d at 1027.
45. Id. at 80, 496 N.E.2d at 1026. In an earlier ruling, the appellate court held the
contract invalid. Id.
46. Id. at 81, 496 N.E.2d at 1027.
47. Id. at 83-84, 496 N.E.2d at 1028.
48. 114 Ill. 2d 150, 499 N.E.2d 1309 (1986).
49. Id. at 163-65, 499 N.E.2d at 1315-16. The purpose of the Illinois Securities Law
is to ensure full disclosure of securities information. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para.
137.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987)(comment). Because the suit was brought concenang ac-
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offering exemption in section 4(G) of the Act applies only to sales
to persons within Illinois.5 °
The defendant Cablevision (the "seller"), an Illinois corporation,
sent an investment letter, circular, and subscription agreement in
connection with the sale of limited partnership units to the plaintiff
(the "purchaser"). The purchaser lived in California and never
came to Illinois at any time during the sale process. The seller also
executed the agreement in Illinois.5 Subsequently, the purchaser
sought to rescind the sale under section 13 of the Act because the
seller failed to register the securities "prior to sale in this state"
pursuant to section 5 of the Act. 52 The purchaser alternatively
contended that the seller violated section 4(G) of the Act which
imposes sales information reporting requirements for sales to "per'53
sons in this state."
In considering the buyer's first contention that the sale was voidable for failure to register the sale pursuant to section 5 of the Act,
the court rejected the argument that section 5 protected only Illinois residents and in-state purchasers. 54 The court stated that the
purchaser's location was not decisive in determining whether there
was a sale of securities in Illinois subject to the section 5 registration requirement.5 Rather, the Act's registration requirements applied to any activity in Illinois that fell within the statutory
56
definition of "sale" as defined in section 2-5 of the Act.
tions occurring in 1982, the governing law is the Illinois Securities Law of 1953, as
amended, which provides in pertinent part the following: section 2-5 defines "sale" as
including the common law definition as well as activities such as contracts to sell, exchanges, attempts or offers to sell and offer solicitations; section 5 requires registration
prior to offer or sale in Illinois with the Secretary of State for all securities transactions
except those exempt under section 4; section 4 provides that sales to not more than thirtyfive persons in this state are exempt from registration and that sales exempt from registration must be reported to the Secretary of State; section 13 provides that transactions not

in compliance with the act may be rescinded. ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 121 1/2, paras. 137.2-

5, 137.4, 137.5, 137.13 (1979).

50. Benjamin, 114 Il. 2d at 169, 499 N.E.2d at 1318.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

154, 499 N.E.2d at
153-54, 499 N.E.2d
154, 499 N.E.2d at
162, 499 N.E.2d at
163, 499 N.E.2d at

1311.
at 1311.
1311.
1315.
1316.

56. Id. at 162.63, 499 N.E.2d at 1316. Thus, the court stated that:
There must be either a "disposition or an attempt to dispose, of a security for
value," a "contract to sell" a security, an "offer" to sell a security, or a "solicitation of an offer" to buy a security ....Furthermore, these activities must take
place within Illinois.
Id. at 164, 499 N.E.2d at 1316 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 para. 137.2-5 (1979).

The court commented that Green v. Weis, Voisin, Cannon, Inc., 479 F.2d 462 (7th Cir.
1973), relied upon by both parties, required an expansive application of the statutory
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The court rejected the buyer's alternative contention that the
sale was voidable for failure to report the sale pursuant to the section 4(G) limited offering exemption from registration. It refused
to recognize that the section 4(G) registration exemption for limited offerings applied to persons located outside of Illinois. s" The
court stated that exemption from registration for sales to "not
more than 35 persons in this state" applied only to sales to persons
physically present in Illinois.5 s Thus, the sale to an out-of-state
resident never present in Illinois was not within the meaning of the
exemption. 59
Additionally, the court relied on the legislative history of the
Act,w° which included a previous exemption enactment generally
applicable to sales to "persons" rather than the instant exemption
applicable to sales to "persons in this State.

'61

The revision per-

suaded the court that the legislature did not intend the section
4(G) exemption to have an extraterritorial effect. 62 Apparently, so
long as a seller of securities limits his sales to thirty-five Illinois
residents or persons physically within Illinois, the seller can market his securities in other states without fear of triggering Illinois'
registration requirement.63
IV.

COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS

A. Debtors and Creditors
The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District decided a
noteworthy debtor-creditor case. 64 In Puritan Finance Corp. v.
definition of sale to achieve the broad, paternalistic purpose of the Act. Benjamin, 114
Ill. 2d at 161, 499 N.E.2d at 1314.
57. Id. at 169, 499 N.E.2d at 1318.
58. Id.

59. Id.
60. Id. at 168, 499 N.E.2d at 1318.
61. Id.
62.

Id. The court noted that the exemption was amended after the instigation of the

action. Id. According to the court, this was additional evidence that the legislature intended only sales to persons in Illinois to count against the sectin 4(G) exemption requirements. Id.
63. Id. at 169, 499 N.E.2d at 1318. The Benjamin court noted that had the exemption applied to the seller, the buyer could have voided the agreement because the seller

had not reported the sale as required by section 4(G). Id.
64. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District also decided a noteworthy
case in debtor-creditor law. In McLean County Bank v. Brokaw, 148 Ill.
App. 3d 103,
107, 498 N.E.2d 910, 913 (4th Dist. 1986), the court held that guarantors were not released from liability when the creditor loans the debtor a greater sum of money than the
guaranty agreement specifies. The case was reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court after
the Survey period. 1988 I1. Lexis 18.
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Vest, 65 the court held that a creditor cannot recover unearned interest from a debtor after a commercial loan default.66 In Puritan,
the defendants, Vests (the "debtors"), entered into a commercial
loan agreement with plaintiff, Puritan (the "creditor"), to finance
the Vests' purchase of a restaurant.67 The debtors defaulted after a
few payments, and the creditor accelerated the maturity date. 8
The trial court granted the creditor's motion for summary judgment and awarded interest for the entire term of the loan.69
The appellate court reversed and refused to allow the creditor to
collect unearned interest. 70 The court stated that allowing the
creditor to collect unearned interest would be inequitable and
would constitute a penalty imposed upon a debtor. 71 The court

rejected the creditor's argument that commercial loans should be
treated differently than consumer loans and thus exempt from the
rule against the collection of unearned interest.72
B. Secured Transactions
The Illinois Supreme Court decided one major case concerning
secured transactions during the Survey year. The Illinois appellate
courts also issued several important decisions in this area.
In State Bank of Piper City v. A-way, Inc.,'3 the Illinois Supreme
Court analyzed a secured creditor's right under section 9-501(1) of
the Uniform Commercial Code (the "U.C.C.") to enforce its security interest in property given as collateral after the secured party
obtained a judgment on a promissory note. The Piper City case
involved a secured creditor who obtained judgment against the
debtor after the debtor defaulted on promissory notes. The secured creditor served the defendant with a citation to discover assets that the defendant held on the debtor's behalf. The defendant
responded that it held 5,141.20 bushels of grain for the debtor.
Confusing the number of bushels with their value, the secured
creditor then sought and obtained an order requiring the defendant
65.

152 Il. App. 3d 625, 504 N.E.2d 913 (1st Dist. 1987).

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

627,
625,
626,
625,

504
504
504
504

N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d

at
at
at
at

915 (1st Dist. 1987).
914.
914.
914.

70. Id. at 627, 504 N.E.2d at 915. The court relied on Illinois Steel Co. v. O'Donnell,
156 11. 624, 41 N.E. 185 (1885), which held that unearned interest on promissory notes
should be deducted on default and accelerated payment of indebtedness. Puritan, 152 Ill.
App. 3d at 626-27, 504 N.E.2d at 915.
71. Puritan, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 627, 504 N.E.2d at 915.

72. Id.
73. 115 11. 2d 401, 504 N.E.2d 737 (1987).
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to pay $5,141.20 as partial satisfaction of the judgment against the
creditor. The defendant sold the grain and remitted $5,141.20 to
the secured creditor and applied the balance to outstanding
charges on the debtor's account.74 Upon discovering its error, the
secured creditor brought an action under Article 9 of the U.C.C. to
enforce its security interest in the proceeds of the grain sale over
and above $5,141.20."
The Illinois Supreme Court held that neither the merger of a
second party's rights into a judgment against the debtor nor the
doctrine of res judicata bars a secured party from enforcing its security interest under section 9-501(1) of the U.C.C. 76 The court
noted that under section 9-501(1), the secured creditor's remedies
are "cumulative. ' 7 Thus "an interest under a security agreement
in personal property is separate and independent of an interest in
collateral that was created by the note itself. '78 Although merger
precluded a secured creditor from taking further action on a note
after a judgment, merger did not preclude enforcement of a security interest. 79 The court likewise concluded that because of the cumulative remedies language of section 9-501(1), res judicata will
not bar a secured creditor from exhausting his U.C.C. remedies,
even against a third party. 0
In Anna National Bank v. Prater,"'the Appellate Court for the
Fifth District considered for the first time in Illinois whether a
mortgagee's interest in crops under a "rents and profits" clause
contained in its mortgage constitutes a security interest subject to
the U.C.C.8 2 The plaintiff, Anna National Bank (the "mortgagee"), and the defendants, Praters (the "mortgagors"), entered into
a mortgage agreement whereby the mortgagors put up their farm
property and its "rents and profits" as collateral in exchange for
financing. The Praters leased the property to a tenant farmer.
Upon the mortgagors' default, the mortgagee brought a foreclosure
action and acquired possession before the tenant farmer harvested
a soybean crop.83 The issue before the appellate court was whether
the mortgagee's interest in the crops was a security interest subject
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

404, 504 N.E.2d at 738.
405, 504 N.E.2d at 738.
408-09, 504 N.E.2d at 740.
409, 504 N.E.2d at 739.
408, 504 N.E.2d at 740.

79. Id.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 409, 504 N.E.2d at 740.
154 I1. App. 3d 6, 506 N.E.2d 769 (5th Dist. 1987).
Id. at 15, 506 N.E.2d at 775.
Id. at 8, 506 N.E.2d at 770.
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to the current crop lender's interest.8 4
The court first determined that, under Illinois law, unsevered
crops growing upon mortgaged premises are deemed to be a part of
the realty." Accordingly, the court concluded that "a rents and
profits' clause in a real estate mortgage conveys no separate right
to the crops growing on the land[:] such a clause does not create a
security interest in personal property... subject to the provisions
of the U.C.C."86 The court also stated that "section 9-312(2) was
neither designed nor intended to give a current year crop lender
priority over a real estate mortgagee's right to rents and profits of
mortgaged property upon taking possession during foreclosure.... "87 Thus, a mortgagee who takes possession before crops
are severed has a claim to the crops superior to that of a tenant
farmer.88 The court further noted, however, that the mortgagee's
interest in unsevered crops upon taking possession is subject to a
valid lease between a debtor and a current year crop lender.89 The
mortgagee-in-possession may claim only the landlord-mortgagor's
share of the crops growing on the mortgaged property. 90
In another action involving secured interests in property, the
Appellate Court for the Second District in InternationalHarvester
Credit Corp. v. Helland9 outlined the measure of damages in
wrongful replevin actions. In that case, the seller wrongfully repossessed tractors. 92 The trial court awarded damages measured
84. Id. at 15, 506 N.E.2d at 774-75. The mortgagee also sought a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to prevent the mortgagors or the tenant farmer from entering
and severing the crop. Id. at 9, 506 N.E.2d at 771. Thereafter, the tenant farmer intervened to challenge the TRO but not to defend the main action in which the rights to the

crop were to be determined. Id. at 10, 506 N.E.2d at 771-72. The tenant farmer's motion
to dissolve the TRO was denied. Id. at 11, 506 N.E.2d at 772. In the main action,
judgment of foreclosure followed, placing the mortgagee as mortgagee-in-possession. Id.
at 8, 506 N.E.2d at 770. Subsequently, the tenant farmer and the mortgagors severed and
sold part of the soybean crop for $8,474.89. Id. at 12, 506 N.E.2d at 773. On several
motions concerning the right to those crop proceeds, the trial court entered summary
judgment for the mortgagee, finding its rights in the crop superior to those of the mortgagors, the tenant farmer, and the tenant farmer's secured creditor. Id. at 13, 506 N.E.2d at

770-73.
85.

Id. at 17, 506 N.E.2d at 776.

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 19, 506 N.E.2d at 778.
Id. at 20, 506 N.E.2d at 778.
Id. at 21, 506 N.E.2d at 779.

90.
91.
92.

Id.
151 Ill. App. 3d 848, 503 N.E.2d 548 (2d Dist. 1987).
Id. at 855, 503 N.E.2d at 553. The plaintiff, International Harvester Credit Cor-

poration ("IHCC"), was a wholly owned financing subsidiary of International Harvester
Company ("IH"), a farm equipment manufacturer not a party herein. Id. at 850, 503
N.E.2d at 550. Leaders Equipment Company ("Leaders"), also not a party in the instant
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by the cost to the buyer of "not having" the equipment during the
period of wrongful detention.9" According to the trial court, plaintiffs in wrongful replevin actions need not introduce evidence as to
the expected use of the wrongfully repossessed equipment.94
The appellate court reversed the trial court's damage award. 95

The court reasoned that the trial court's approach to calculating
damages in wrongful replevin actions rested upon the often errone96
ous assumption that the buyer would have used the property.
The appellate court stated that, henceforth, the injured party
would be required "to establish by competent evidence the use to
which the property would have been put had it remained in his
possession.'

Although Helland probably was decided correctly, it presents
difficult problems of proof for buyers. Buyers, according to Helland, must prove a negative: what use would the buyer have made
of the property but for the wrongful replevin. Courts should be
sensitive to this problem when applying Helland in future cases.
V.

A.

CONTRACTS

ContractFormation

The Illinois Supreme Court decided one case involving contract
formation issues during the Survey year. 98 In addition, Illinois apaction, operated an IH dealership. Id. Under the dealer agreement, Leader was prohibited from selling any new IH equipment prior to paying IH the full purchase price, unless
Leaders sold the equipment in the ordinary course of retail business. Id. Thereafter,
Leaders purchased five new tractors from IH and paid with promissory notes. Id. Subsequently, Leaders made an oral agreement with defendant Helland to exchange the new
tractors for cash and trade-ins. Id. at 851,503 N.E.2d at 550. Helland later resold some
of the tractors at an auction. Id. IHCC filed a complaint for replevin for those tractors
still in Helland's possession and secured an order for writ of replevin. Id. Replevin is an

action to recover property wrongfully possessed by another.

BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY

1168 (5th ed. 1983). IHCC took possession of the tractors. Helland, 151 Ill. App. 3d at
851, 503 N.E.2d at 550. The trial court entered judgment for Helland on the grounds that
the sale from Leaders to Helland was in the ordinary course of business. Id. at 851, 503
N.E.2d at 551.
93. Helland, 151 Il1.App. 3d at 855-56, 503 N.E.2d at 553.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 860, 503 N.E.2d at 556.
96. Id. at 858-59, 503 N.E.2d at 555. The court cited National Contract Purchase
Corp. v. McCormick, 264 Ill. App. 63 (1st Dist. 1931), in which the court based its
estimate of the fair use of a replevied rental automobile on the reasonable rental value of
the car for the reasonable time the wronged party could have been expected to use the
car. Helland, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 857-58, 503 N.E.2d at 554-55.
97. Id. at 859, 503 N.E.2d at 555.
98. The court decided also Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazereth Hospital Center, 115
Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987), which primarily involved labor law issues. In consid-
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pellate courts considered the standing of putative third-party beneficiaries in several cases.
In Ceres Illinois, Inc. v. Illinois Scrap Processing,99 an extremely
fact-dependent decision, the Illinois Supreme Court considered
whether the parties intended to enter into a binding fifteen year
commercial land lease agreement only after reducing it to writing.
The court held that the parties intended to be bound after reducing
the agreement to writing, outlining a wide range of factors that a
court should consider when determining whether parties to an oral
agreement intended to be bound contractually only after an agreement is reduced to writing." e
The defendant, Illinois Scrap, occupied the western half of a
piece of property for use in its scrap business pursuant to an oral
agreement with International Great Lakes Shipping Company
("Great Lakes").' 0 ' The plaintiff, Ceres Terminals ("Ceres"), occupied the eastern half of the property.102 Illinois Scrap installed
equipment and conducted a full-scale scrap-processing operation
with Great Lakes while it negotiated for a written long-term
lease.'0 3 During lengthy negotiations, the Great Lakes's attorney
sent a letter which provided the terms of the temporary arrangements for the defendant's use of the property."'4 Illinois Scrap also
ering whether the defendant hospital was required to follow particular procedures in employee termination, however, the court determined that the employee handbook detailing
termination procedure created enforceable contractual rights. Id. at 490, 505 N.E.2d at
319. The court stated that for an employee handbook to create contractual obligations,
the three traditional requirements for contract formation were required: 1) clear language of an offer; 2) handbook dissemination such that the employee was aware of its
contents and reasonably believed it to be an offer; and 3) employee acceptance by commencing or continuing to work after learning of the policy. Id. at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318.
For a more detailed discussion of the case, see the Labor Law article of this Survey.
99. 114 Ill. 2d 133, 500 N.E.2d 1 (1986).
100. Id. at 144-45, 500 N.E.2d at 5.
101. Id. at 137, 500 N.E.2d at 1.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 137-38, 500 N.E.2d at 1-2.
104. Id. at 138, 500 N.E.2d at 2. The letter provided:
As per our recent discussions and as per agreement, the following will apply
to the storage of your material on approximately six acres on the western end of
our Iroquois Terminal.
Commencing July 1, 1982, we offer 30 days free storage. Thereafter the fee
will be $2,666.67 per 30 day period or fraction thereof.
It is anticipated that prior to the end of July, the legal arrangements for your
use of the above mentioned property will have been worked out among our
companies and the Chicago Regional Port District. It is understood that those
arrangements and agreements, when mutually approved, will take precedence
over this one.
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paid rent. 05 Ceres subsequently purchased all of the Great Lakes
stock, informed Illinois Scrap that its use was "detrimental" to Ceres' operation, and requested that Illinois Scrap cease operations.'°0
Ceres brought suit to secure compliance. 0 7 Illinois Scrap argued
that the oral agreement was an enforceable contract and evidenced
a long-term lease to Illinois Scrap that was enforceable 08
The Illinois Supreme Court held that a reduction to writing was
a condition precedent to a valid contract between Great Lakes and
Illinois Scrap. 09 The court stated that the following factors should
be considered in determining whether the parties intended a reduction to writing to be a condition precedent to a contract:
1) whether the contract is one usually put in writing; 2) whether
extensive detail is involved; 3) whether large sums of money are
involved; 4) whether writing is required for full description of covenants contemplated; 5) whether negotiations indicated a written
document was intended; and 6) whether subsequent conduct indicated that the parties considered the agreement binding.t ° The
court found that the great changes in negotiation terms, the entrustment of the dealings to attorneys, Great Lakes' attorney's letter indicating that the oral agreement was not binding, and Illinois
Scrap's formal requests to occupy the property indicated that the
parties intended a reduction to writing to be a condition precedent
to a contract."'
Ceres illustrates the wisdom of the axiom that parties should memorialize all agreements in writing. The court has no sympathy
for the parties who fail to reach a written agreement. In fact, the
high costs incurred by Illinois Scrap played no role in the court's
analysis of whether a reduction to writing was a condition precedent to a contract. The court's willingness to search for evidence
of a condition precedent further reveals its preference for written
agreements.
105. Id. at 139, 500 N.E.2d at 2.
106. Id. at 140, 500 N.E.2d at 3.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 141, 500 N.E.2d at 4.
109. Id. at 144-45, 500 N.E.2d at 5. The trial court held also that the plaintiff was
estopped from asserting the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 140, 500 N.E.2d at 3. On appeal,
however, the appellate court held that the plaintiff was not estopped from asserting the
Statute of Frauds to render unenforceable the fifteen-year oral land lease agreement. Id.
at 141, 500 N.E.2d at 3. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the appellate court's determination on this issue was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and affirmed its
finding. Id. at 147-48, 500 N.E.2d at 7.
110. Id. at 144, 500 N.E.2d at 5.
111. Id. at 146-47, 500 N.E.2d at 6.
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Illinois appellate courts refused to recognize third-party beneficiary status in several cases, thus tightening the standing requirements for breach of contract actions. In Bernstein v. LindWaldock & Co.,"1 2 the Appellate Court for the First District held
that a guarantor-of-trades member of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange was not a third-party beneficiary of a membership agreement between the Exchange and an Exchange member when the
agreement provided that the member would be bound by the Ex13
change rules.'
In Illinois, third-party beneficiary status is determined by
whether the agreement between the parties was intended, at the
time of execution, to directly benefit the third party.' 4 The court
found that the defendant was not a member of any class which the
plaintiff and the Exchange intended to benefit in their membership
agreement."I5 In addition, the court disagreed with the trade guarantor's contention that the
agreement barred Exchange members
6
from suing one another."
In Miller v. Sears, Roebuck and Company," 7 the Appellate
Court for the First District held that under section 2-318 of the
U.C.C. an injured customer was not a third-party beneficiary of a
warranty of an air compressor given by a seller to a transmission
shop." 8 According to the court, the drafters of the U.C.C. pro112.
113.

153 Il. App. 3d 108, 505 N.E.2d 1114 (1st Dist. 1987).
Id. at 110-11, 505 N.E.2d at 1116. At trial the following facts were established.

Plaintiff Bernstein (the "Exchange member"), leased his Exchange membership to a
third-party, Caan. Id. at 109, 505 N.E,2d at 1115. Defendant Lind-Wadock (the "trade

guarantor"), a clearing member of the exchange, guaranteed Caan's trades. Id. In 1980,
Caan suffered losses, and at the trade guarantor's request, the Exchange sold the membership and applied the proceeds to Caan's indebtedness to the trade guarantor. Id. The
Exchange member brought an action to recover the proceeds, and the trade guarantor
counterclaimed for damages, alleging among other things, that it was a third-party beneficiary of a provision in the plaintiff's membership agreement with the Exchange that Ex-

change members would not sue one another. Id. The trial court dismissed the
counterclaim on the grounds the trade guarantor was not a third-party beneficiary of the
Exchange member's agreement with the Exchange. Id. at 109-10, 505 N.E.2d at 1115.
114. Id. at 110, 505 N.E.2d at 1116 (citing Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett, 346
I1. 252, 178 N.E. 498 (1931); People ex rel. Resnik v. Curtis & Davis, Architects &

Planners, Inc., 78 Ill. 2d 381, 400 N.E.2d 918 (1980); Bates & Rogers Constr. Corp. v.
Greeley & Hansen, 109 Ill. 2d 225, 486 N.E.2d 902 (1985)).
115.

Bernstein, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 110, 505 N.E.2d at 1116.

116. Id. at 111, 505 N.E.2d at 1117.
117.

148 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 500 N.E.2d 557 (1st Dist. 1986).

118. Id. at 1025, 500 N.E.2d at 559 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 2-318
(1985)). In Miller, plaintiff Miller (the "customer") was on the premises of B &W Transmission, not a party to the action, discussing the repair of his automobile. Id. at 1023, 500
N.E.2d at 558. An air compressor purchased by B & W from defendant Sears, Roebuck
and Co. (the "seller") exploded, injuring the customer. Id. The customer alleged that
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vided three altermte definitions of a third-party beneficiary of a
seller's warranties.11 9 The Miller court reasoned that the Illinois
Legislature's choice of the most restrictive alternative indicated an
intent to limit the seller's liability for breach of warranty to only
those persons expressly enumerated in section 2-318.120
The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that persons who
are the "functional equivalents" of those mentioned in section 2318 also have standing to sue for breach of warranty.' 2' Several

other Illinois appellate decisions have interpreted section 2-318 to
extend to "functional equivalents"., 2

Federal courts in Illinois

have refused to recognize an extension to "functional equivalents"
because such recognition would be tantamount to judicial legislation.12 3 The Miller court24 adopted the position taken by federal
con-ts sitting in Illinois.'

4iller gives an unnecessarily restrictive reading to section 2-318.
The "functional equivalent" test that it rejects is little more than a
common sense recognition that the drafters of the U.C.C. could
not enumerate every class of third-party beneficiaries in even the
most restrictive version of section 2-318. Moreover, the court
reads too much into the Legislature's failure to amend section 2318 after decisions adopted the functional equivalent approach.
The court interprets such inaction as disapproval when legislative
inaction may well signify approval. Finally, the court failed to
the seller's breach of warranty resulted in his personal injury. Id. at 1022-23, 500 N.E.2d
at 557-58. Although other claims were brought, the appeal was limited to the warranty

claims. Id. at 1023, 500 N.E.2d at 558. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss the warranty claims stating that plaintiff was not within the class of persons to
whom warranty protection extended under the U.C.C. Id.
119.

Id. at 1024-25, 500 N.E.2d at 559. These included: a) the contracting party and

family members or guests who reasonably could be expected to use the goods and were
injured in person (this was the provision ultimately chosen by the legislature, ILL. REV.
STAT.

ch. 26, para. 2-318 (1986)); b) any natural person who reasonably could be ex-

pected to use the goods and was injured in person; or c) any person who could reasonably
be expected to use the goods and is injured. Miller, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 1024-25, 500

N.E.2d at 559.
120. Miller, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 1024-25, 500 N.E.2d at 558-59. The court agreed
with the previous decision of Knox v. North Am. Car Corp., 80 Il1. App. 3d 683, 399
N.E.2d 1355 (1st Dist. 1980), on this point, but refused to extend protection to the "functional equivalent" of a guest as suggested by the Knox court. Miller, 148 I1. App. 3d at
1025, 500 N.E.2d at 559.
121. Miller, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 1025, 500 N.E.2d at 559.
122. Id. at 1024, 500 N.E.2d at 558 (citing Knox, 80 Il. App. 3d at 683, 399 N.E.2d
at 1355; Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Sys., 118 Ill. App. 3d 520, 455 N.E.2d 142 (1st

Dist. 1983)).
123. Id. (citing Hemphill v. Sayers, 552 F. Supp. 685 (S.D. Ill. 1982); In re JohnsMansville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ill. 1981)).
124. Id. at 1025, 500 N.E.2d at 559.
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canvas the case law to determine if decisions after the Legislature's
adoption of section 2-318 had loosened the standing
requirements,
125
as the U.C.C. drafters appeared to contemplate.
The Appellate Court for the First District, in Wheeling Trust &
Savings Bank v. Tremco Inc.,2 6 held that a reference to a property
owner's construction location as the delivery site in a purchase order issued by a subcontractor to a materialman did not give the
property owner standing as a third-party beneficiary to sue the materialman.127 The appellate court reasoned that the property owner
was not a third-party beneficiary of the contracts with the materialmen because the contracts failed to state that "the windows were
specifically for the plaintiffs."' 2 The court also noted that the contracts did not require the materialmen to consult with the property
owner.' 29 The court thus distinguished the case from People ex rel.
Resnik v. Curtis & Davis, Architects & Planners,Inc.,13° in which
the Stat of Illinois was recognized as a third-party beneficiary of a
contract between a contractor and an architectural firm, which expressly provided that the architectural firm was to consult with the
13 1
State of Illinois concerning revision of specifications.
Tremco's analysis exemplifies the wooden approach to thirdparty beneficiary issues taken by the Illinois courts. The court exalted the form of the contract over the substance of the transaction.
Surely a materialman who delivers a product or service to a building site knows that the property owner is the beneficiary of its
work. Whether a purchase order mentions the owner by name or
requires the materialman to consult with the property owner is
125. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 29, para. 2-318 comment 3 (Smith-Hurd 1963) (amended
1966).
126. 153 Ill. App. 3d 136, 505 N.E.2d 1045 (1st Dist. 1987).
127. Id. at 140, 505 N.E.2d at 1048. In Tremco, Wheeling Trust, the plaintiff property owner, entered into agreements with prime contractors for the construction of an
office building. Id. at 138, 505 N.E.2d at 1046-47. The prime contractors contracted
with subcontractors who subsequently entered into agreements with materialmen to provide the necessary supplies. Id. at 138, 505 N.E.2d at 1047. The purchase orders to two
of the materialmen referred to the project but not to the property owner directly. Id. at
141, 505 N.E.2d at 1048. Irreparable streaks began to develop on the windows over a
year after the building's completion. Id. at 138, 505 N.E.2d at 1047. The plaintiff
brought suit against contractors, subcontractors, and materialmen, alleging breach of
contract, and warranties and seeking damages for the economic loss for the streaked
windows. Id. at 138-39, 505 N.E.2d at 1047. The appeal was limited to the issue of
whether the trial court's dismissal of actions against the materialmen was proper. Id. at
139, 505 N.E.2d at 1047-48.
128. Id. at 141, 505 N.E.2d at 1048.
129. Id. at 141, 505 N.E.2d at 1049.
130. 78 Ill. 2d 381, 400 N.E.2d 918 (1980).
131. Tremco, 153 11. App. 3d at 140-41, 505 N.E.2d at 1048-49.
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largely irrelevant. Courts should read contracts in light of industry
practices and the actual knowledge of the parties when determining third-party beneficiary status, especially when the court's denial of standing as a third-party beneficiary leaves the property
owner without a direct remedy against the materialmen.
The Appellate Court for the Fifth District held that a prime contractor was not a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the
co-prime contractor and the property owner in J.F, Inc. v. S.M.
Wilson & Co. 132 In this case, the property owner, Illinois Capital
Development Board (the "board"), awarded one prime contract to
defendant S.M. Wilson as general construction contractor and another to plaintiff J.F., Inc. as heating and electric contractor. Both
contracts stipulated the same completion date. Because of various
delays, however, the construction was completed a year and a half
late. J.F. Inc. brought suit to recover from S.M. Wilson the costs
of delays, alleging standing as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the board and S.M. Wilson. 3 3 S.M. Wilson counterclaimed. 134 Both parties argued that the court should follow
decisions from other jurisdictions that prime contractors are thirdparty beneficiaries of the contracts among the property owner and
the other prime contractors.- 5
The court rejected this approach and found that the contractors
lacked standing as third-party beneficiaries.1 36 The court reasoned
that only the eventual occupant of the building might be a thirdparty beneficiary of the contracts among the board and the prime
contractors.137 It noted that neither contractor was mentioned in
132. 152 Ill. App. 3d 873, 878, 504 N.E.2d 1266, 1269 (5th Dist. 1987).
133. Id. at 875, 504 N.E.2d at 1267. The plaintiff also brought an action against the
board. The trial court dismissed that action to the court of claims, because the board was
a state entity subject only to the jurisdiction of that court. Id.
134. Id. The trial court entered judgment on the cross breach of contract claims
against the defendant for $37,000 and for $5,000 against the plaintiff on the defendant's
counterclaim. Id. at 876, 504 N.E.2d at 1267.
135. Id. at 879-81, 504 N.E.2d at 1269-71. According to the court, however, other
jurisdictions had so held because either the state was immune from suit or because the
contracts at issue explicitly placed responsibility of supervision and coordination of the
project on one of the prime contractors. Id. (citing W.H. Stubbings Co. v. Worlds Columbian Exposition Co., 110 Ill. App. 210 (1903); United States Steel Corp. v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 668 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836 (1982); M.T. Reed
Constr. Co. v. Virginia Metal Products Corp., 213 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1954); Thomas v.
Snavely Co. v. Brown Constr. Co., 16 Ohio Misc. 50, 239 N.E.2d 759 (1968); J. Louis
Crum Corp. v. Alfred Lindgren, Inc., 564 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. App. 1978); Hanberry Corp.
v. State Bldg. Comm'n, 390 So. 2d 277 (Miss. 1980); Broadway Maint. Corp. v. Rutgers,
180 N.J.Super. 350, 434 A.2d 1125 (1981), aff'd, 90 N.J. 253, 447 A.2d 906 (1982)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 877, 504 N.E.2d at 1268-69.
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the other contractor's agreement with the board. 38 Perhaps most
importantly for the court, the contracts provided self-help remedies in the form of change orders for the delays caused by the other
contractor. 39 Moreover, both contractors could sue the Board for
its contribution to the delays. ,40
B.

Contract Construction

Appellate courts considered several contract construction issues
during the Survey year. The Appellate Court for the First District,
in Perlman v. Westin Hotel Co. , 14' held that a hotel denied a dining
club member, whose membership entitled him to a free meal at his
choice of two restaurants, the benefit of his bargain by closing one
of its restaurants. 42 In Perlman, the defendant, Westin Hotel (the
"hotel"), offered dining club memberships that included a free
43
meal at either the Consort Room or the Chelsea Restaurant.1
Plaintiff Perlman purchased a membership but was unable to have
his free meal at the Consort Room, as he preferred, before the hotel
closed the restaurant.44 Subsequently,
the plaintiff brought a class
145
contract.
of
breach
for
action
The appellate court rejected both the plaintiff's contention that
the agreement was an option contract giving the plaintiff the choice
of performance and the defendant's contention that the agreement
was an alternate methods of performance contract giving the defendant a choice among performances. 46 The court analogized the
138. Id. at 878, 504 N.E.2d at 1269.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 154 Il. App. 3d 346, 506 N.E.2d 1318 (1st Dist. 1987), cert. denied, - Ill. 2d
-, 515 N.E.2d 125.
142. Id. at 351, 506 N.E.2d at 1321.
143. Id. at 348, 506 N.E.2d at 1319.
144. Id. at 349, 506 N.E.2d at 1319.
145. Id. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds
that the defendant did not promise to keep both restaurants open or to maintain a restaurant with the ambience of the Consort Room. Id. at 349, 506 N.E.2d at 1319-20. Both the
trial court and the appellate court agreed that the Consort Room was the more elegant
restaurant. Id. at 347, 506 N.E.2d at 1319.
146. Id. at 349-50, 506 N.E.2d at 1320. The court stated that the membership agreement was not an option contract because the promisee did not keep an offer open in
exchange for consideration. Id. An alternative methods agreement is one in which the
promisor reserves the right to carry out the contract in only one of two or more possible
methods. Id. at 350, 506 N.E.2d at 1320. The court stated that the defendant did not
expressly reserve the right to elect the manner of performance, and the plaintiff was
partly induced by the inclusion of the "exclusive" Consort Room to enter the deal. Id. at
350-51, 506 N.E.2d at 1320-21. The court stated that the choice of where to dine was
with the member, not the defendant, thus the agreement was not the "alternative methods" type. Id. at 351, 506 N.E.2d at 1321. The court distinguished Sperry & Hutchinson
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instant action to Aldrich v. Bay State Construction Co., ' 4 in which
the defendant offered to buy the plaintiff's railway ties with stock
in either of two railway companies.1 48 In Aldrich, the defendants
ultimately chose the company stock with which to pay.1 49 The
Massachusetts court held, however, that the plaintiffs had the right
to choose because "it is the person who is to take one of two apples
who may 'take either apple.' "s15 Based on the reasoning in Aldrich, the court concluded that the plaintiff stated a cause of action
for breach of contract and reversed the trial court.'"
Justice Quinlan dissented on the grounds that the defendant had

not agreed to maintain the Consort Room or provide a restaurant

with comparable ambience. 52 Justice Quinlan argued that under
Illinois law, when a contract provides for alternate performances,
the promisor retains the right to elect which of the alternatives will
15 3
be performed, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise.
In Pelz v. StreatorNationalBank, 5 4 the Appellate Court for the
Third District considered whether an assignment of a long-term

installment contract for the sale of commercial property to a bank
could bind the bank to honor the contract. In Pelz, Virginia and
Merlin Elliott (the "buyers") purchased real estate from the plaintiffs, Peter and Carol Pelz.5'" The buyers assigned their rights
under the real estate installment contract to the defendant, Streator
Bank (the "bank"), in return for financing. 5 6 The buyers subsequently defaulted on their obligations.' 7 The bank made payments to the plaintiffs for several months thereafter and collected
Co. v. Seigel, Cooper & Co., 309 11. 193, 140 N.E. 864 (1923), in which the defendant
department store gave a choice of coupon redemption in merchandise or cash, but later
sold its business. Perlman, 154 11. App. 3d at 351-52, 506 N.E.2d at 1321-22. The appellate court in Perlmanstated that the Sperry case was distinguishable because the plaintiff
could have redeemed the coupons at the new store in that case and because Seigel merely
changed owners, as opposed to Perlman in which the choice no longer existed. Perlman,
154 Ill. App. 3d at 352, 506 N.E.2d at 1321-22.
147. 186 Mass. 489, 72 N.E. 53 (1904).
148. Perlman, 154 11. App. 3d at 352-53, 506 N.E.2d at 1322.
149. Aldrich, 186 Mass. at 489, 72 N.E.2d at 53.
150. Id. at 493, 72 N.E.2d at 54-55.
151. Perlman, 154 Ill. App. 3d at 353-54, 506 N.E.2d at 1323.
152. Id. at 354, 506 N.E.2d at 1323 (Quinlan, J. dissenting).
153. Id. at 355, 506 N.E.2d at 1323-24 (citing Fidelity Fed. Say. and Loan Assn. v.
Pioneer Nat'l. Title, 428 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D. I1. 1977); Metz v. Albrecht, 52 II1.491
(1869); 129 ILL. L. & PRAC. Contracts § 245; 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 363 (1964)).
154. 145 I1. App. 3d 946, 496 N.E.2d 315 (3d Dist. 1986).
155. Id. at 947, 496 N.E.2d at 317.
156. Id. at 948, 496 N.E.2d at 317.
157. Id. at 950, 496 N.E. 2d at 318. The bank caused the trustee in bankruptcy to
obtain an order of abandonment of the property as well. Id.
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rents from tenants.158 When the bank discontinued payments, the

plaintiffs brought an action for breach of the installment
contract.5 9
The appellate court stated that Illinois courts infer an assumption by the assignee of a land contract of his assignor's contractual
duties upon clear and convincing evidence that such an assumption
was intended by the parties. 6° The court found that the language
in the assignment, that the bank "shall be deemed the vendee" if
the bank made payments to the plaintiffs, supported an inference
that the bank had assumed the buyer's duties under the installment
contract. 161 Such an inference was especially appropriate because
the bank made payments
and took an active role in the manage62
ment of the property. 1

In Verbaere v. Community Bank of Homewood-Flossmoor,161 the
Appellate Court for the First District analyzed the rights of a bank
upon the sale of property to seize cash collateral that was deposited
in exchange for the release of a second mortgage on the property.
The plaintiffs, the Verbaeres, secured a loan from defendant, Community Bank (the "bank"), to purchase a motor home. The credit
insurance policy provided that if Peter Verbaere was unable to
make loan payments because of death or disability, the insurance
company would make loan payments on his behalf. 164 The collateral for the loan was the insurance policy, a purchase-money security interest in the motor home, and a second mortgage on the
Verbaeres' home. Subsequently, Peter Verbaere sustained permanently disabling injuries, and the insurance company took over the
loan payments pursuant to the insurance policy. Several years
later, the Verbaeres contracted to sell their residence. The bank
agreed to release the second mortgage on the Verbaeres' residence
if the Verbaeres deposited, in cash, the remaining balance due on
the motor home loan: The bank further agreed to send a monthly
check equivalent to the amount the insurance company paid pursu158. Id. at 950, 496 N.E.2d at 318-19.
159. Id. at 947, 496 N.E.2d at 317. The trial court awarded damages to the plaintiffs
in the amount of the balance due under the contract and awarded attorney's fees and
costs. Id.
160. Id. at 954, 496 N.E.2d at 321.
161. Id. at 954, 496 N.E.2d at 322.
162. Id.
163. 148 Ill. App. 3d 249, 498 N.E.2d 843 (1st Dist. 1986), cert. denied, - Ill. 2d -

505 N.E. 2d 363 (1987). For a discussion of the insurance law aspects of this case, see the
Insurance Law section of this Survey.
164. Id. at 251, 498 N.E.2d at 845.
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ant to the credit insurance policy. 1 65 Upon the sale of the residence
and without the consent of the plaintiffs,
the bank seized the cash
66
deposit and paid off the motor home.
The appellate court held that the defendant's seizure of the cash
without the plaintiffs' consent was a breach of a contract which
provided for an exchange of a second mortgage for cash collateral. 67 According to the court, the defendant was not justified in
seizing the cash because the cash secured the mobile home, and not
the residence that was being sold. 68 Thus, the bank had no contractual right to seize the cash collateral upon the sale of the residence. 69 The court stated that it found no support for the
argument that the exchange of collateral permitted the bank to
seize substituted collateral and thereby pay off the underlying
mortgage. 70 The court also rejected the bank's contention that it
had properly relied on "industry custom" of
paying off the mortga17
gee upon the sale of mortgaged property. 1
C.

Contract Remedies

The Illinois Supreme Court decided one noteworthy case involving remedies for breach of contract during the Survey year. 72 In
WE. Erickson Construction, Inc. v. Congress-Kenilworth Corp., the
Illinois Supreme Court applied the doctrine of substantial performance in a dispute over a waterslide construction contract.1 73 The
court held that because the plaintiff substantially performed its
contract, it was entitled to the amount bargained for less the difference between the actual value of the construction work 7and
the
4
value of the work had the contract been fully performed.
165. Id. at 252, 498 N.E.2d at 845.
166. Id. at 252, 498 I.E.2d at 846. When the insurance company learned the motor
home had been paid off, it discontinued payments. Id. at 252-53, 498 N.E.2d at 846. The
trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on the ground that the defendant had complied
with industry custom. Id. at 251, 498 N.E.2d at 845.
167. Id. at 253, 498 N.E.2d at 846. The court dismissed allegations of fraud, breach
of trust, and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 255-58, 498 N.E.2d 847-49.
168. Id. at 254, 498 N.E.2d at 846-47.
169. Id. at 254, 498 N.E.2d at 847.

170.

Id.

171.
172.

Id. at 254, 498 N.E.2d at 846-47.
W.E. Erickson Constr., Inc. v. Congress-Kenilworth Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 119, 503

N.E.2d 233 (1986).
173. Erickson, 115 III. 2d at 126-28, 503 N.E.2d at 236-37 (1986). The damages
awarded for substantially performed construction contracts is the difference between the
contract price and the value of the substantially performed construction with defects. Id.
at 128, 503 N.E.2d at 237.
174. Id. at 128, 503 N.E.2d at 237.
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At trial, evidence showed that the defendant, Congress-Kenilworth (the "property owner"), contracted with plaintiff, W.E. Erickson, for the construction of a concrete waterslide for not more
than $535,000. The agreement provided that the contractor would
make monthly applications for payment and would receive an interest rate of t;io percent over the prime rate on the property
owner's overdue balances. The property owner paid only $150,000
on the contract. The contractor brought suit seeking $550,000 for
full performance, but the trial court awarded only $352,000, less
the $150,000 already paid.'"7
The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that the contractor substantially performed its contract,
but remanded the case for a more precise calculation of damages.' 7 6 The court also held that the contractor waived its right to
interest on overdue payments by failing to submit timely applications for payment. 7 7 On the property owner's cross-appeal, the
court held that the contractor was liable for 178
the costs of a wrongful
appointment of a receiver for the property.
The Appellate Courts for the First and Second Districts decided
cases during the Survey year concerning the statute of limitations
for breach of contract actions. Brown v. Goodman, 79 involved a
written five-year option agreement which allowed the plaintiffseller, Brown, to repurchase real estate from the purchaser,
Kuhny. The option agreement specifically provided that a sale to a
third party was subject to Brown's right to repurchase. Kuhny
sold the land to the defendant, Goodman.1 0 Brown unsuccessfully
attempted to exercise his repurchase option but waited almost ten
years to sue." 8 ' The issue before the appellate court was whether
the option contract was written, in which case the ten-year statute
of limitations applied, or whether the five-year statute of limitations applied because the option contract was in effect oral as it did
82
not expressly name Goodman.
The appellate court held that the option contract was oral for
175. Id. r~t 125, 503 N.E.2d at 236. The appellate court remanded for recalculation of
damage, under the doctrine of substantial performance. Id. at 123, 503 N.E.2d at 235.
176. Id. at 128, 503 N.E.2d at 237.

177.

Id. at 129, 503 N.E.2d at 238.

178. Id. at 131-32, 503 N.E.2d at 239.
179. 147 Il1. App. 3d 935, 498 N.E.2d 854 (1st Dist. 1986).
180. Id. at 937, 498 N.E.2d at 855.
181. Id. at 937-38, 498 N.E.2d at 855-56.
182. Id. at 939, 498 N.E.2d at 856. The trial court dismissed the action as not being
within the five-year statute of limitations for oral agreements. Id. at 938, 498 N.E.2d at
856; See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-205 (1985). The statute of limitations for
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the purposes of the statute of limitations and that Brown's suit was
time-barred because Goodman was not named in the option contract.' 8 3 According to the court, an agreement is considered written only if all essential terms of the contract, including the
identities of the parties, are in writing and are readily ascertainable
from the instrument.' 8 4 When parol evidence is necessary to make
the contract complete, the contract is treated as oral under the stat185
ute of limitations.
Brown stands for the proposition that a contract that meets the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds still may not be written for
limitations purposes. As the court recognized, Illinois, unlike
many other jurisdictions, requires, in addition to the prerequisites
of the Statute of Frauds, that all of the essential terms of the contract be in writing in the contract. The wisdom of this additional
requirement is questionable as a general matter in an era when contracting parties by agreement are apt to leave important contractual provisions unspecified and subject to later negotiation. The
Illinois approach is especially inappropriate with long-term option
contracts for land, when changes in parties often cannot be
anticipated.
In Board of Education v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Co.,186 the Appellate Court for the Second District answered affirmatively the question whether parties can contract for a limitation period shorter than that provided by statute.1 87 The
performance bond at issue in Hartford included a provision requiring the plaintiff, the Board of Education (the "Board"), to bring
suit on the bond within two years from the date of the final payment on the contract. 8 The Board brought suit, alleging improper construction of a swimming pool, almost ten yearq after the
last payment fell due, but within the ten-year statute of limitations. s9 The appellate court upheld the lower court's enforcement
of the contractual limitations period, observing that two years was
not an unreasonable limitations period, that the provision was clear
and unambiguous, and that the weight of authority from other
written agreements is ten years. Brown, 147 Il1.App. 3d at 939, 498 N.E.2d at 856. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-206 (1985).
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Brown, 147 I1. App. 3d at 941, 498 N.E.2d at 858.
Id. at 939, 498 N.E.2d at 856-57.
Id. at 939, 498 N.E.2d at 857.
152 Il. App. 3d 745, 504 N.E.2d 1000 (2d Dist, 1987).
Id. at 752, 504 N.E.2d at 1005.
Id. at 747, 504 N.E.2d at 1002.
Id. at 746-48, 504 N.E.2d at 1001-02.
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states favored enforcement of such provisions. 190
The Illinois appellate courts also considered the Statute of
Frauds as a defense to breach of contract actions. ' 9' The Appellate
Court for the Second District in Nelson v. Estes' 92 considered
whether the Statute of Frauds barred a cause of action based on an
option contract for land that allegedly was modified orally. In Nelson, the plaintiff, Nelson (the "seller"), sold the subject real estate
to the defendants, Estes (the "buyers"), pursuant to an option contract. 9 3 The seller filed a forcible entry and detainer action after
defendants failed to make payments according to the schedule in
the contract. 94 The buyers asserted as a defense that the parties
orally modified the option contract to allow the buyers more time
for payment.'9 The seller196used the Statute of Frauds to counterattack against the defense.
The appellate court held that the possible applicability of the
"waiver exception" to the general rule that under the Statute of
Frauds an executory contract cannot be orally modified precluded
summary judgment in the plaintiff's favor. 197 The waiver exception is invoked when the party asserting the Statute of Frauds
waives performance of written provisions and the other party detri190. Id. at 750-52, 504 N.E.2d at 1005 (citing Con-Plex Division of U.S. Indus., Inc.
v. Vicon, Inc., 448 So. 2d 191 (La. App. 1984) (a provision limiting the time to bring suit
under a surety bond to two years was enforceable); Timberline Elec. Supply Corp. v. Ins.
Co. of North America, 72 A.D.2d 905, 421 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1979), aff'd, 52 N.Y.2d 793,
436 N.Y.S.2d 707, 417 N.E.2d 1248 (1980) (parties could shorten the statutory period of
limitation in their surety contract); Quin Blair Enter., Inc. v. Julien Constr. Co., 597 P.2d
945 (Wyo. 1979) (reasonable time limitations on building contract bond suits enforceable); Camelot Excavating Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 89 Mich. App. 219, 280
N.W.2d 491 (1979), aff'd 410 Mich. 118, 301 N.W.2d 275 (1981) (bond suit limitation,
clearly providing suits must be brought in one year, enforceable when there was no controlling state law that prohibited such a limitation); Rumsey Elec. Co. v. Univ. of Del.,
358 A.2d 712 (Del. 1976) (time limitation shorter than that provided by statute enforceable as long as no contractual provision to the contrary); Sam Finley, Inc. v. Interstate
Fire Ins. Co., 135 Ga. App. 14, 217 S.E.2d 358 (1975) (bond prohibiting commencement
of a lawsuit on the bond after one year following completion of work was not void on
grounds of public policy)).
191. The Statute of Frauds provides:
"[N]o action shall be brought to charge any person upon any contract for the
sale of lands... for a longer term than one year, unless such contract or some
memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be
charged therewith . ..."
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 59, para. 2 (1985).
192. 154 II. App. 3d 937, 504 N.E.2d 530 (2d Dist. 1987).
193. Id. at 938, 507 N.E.2d at 531.
194. Id. at 938, 507 N.E.2d at 530-31.
195. Id. at 938, 507 N.E.2d at 531.
196. Id. at 940, 507 N.E.2d at 532.
197. Id. at 941, 507 N.E.2d at 533.
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mentally relies on the oral modification. 98 In addition, the court
canvassed Illinois law and concluded that the party seeking to assert the Statute of Frauds need not have induced the other party to
an oral modification in order for the exception to apply; detrimental reliance is sufficient.199
In another Statute of Frauds case, Gibbons v. Stillwell,2°° the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District held that partial performance of an oral contract does not remove the contract from
the Statute of Frauds in an action at law rather than equity. 20 ' In
Gibbons, the plaintiff, Gibbons, brought a legal malpractice suit
against the defendant, Stillwell, based on advice concerning Gibbon's rights as a prospective borrower against a bank concerning
the bank's alleged oral commitment for a twenty-year loan. 20 2 The
sufficiency of the defendant's advice against attempting to enforce
the agreement depended on whether the bank's partial performance of the loan agreement in the form of loan advances made the
oral loan commitment enforceable. 203 The court concluded, without analysis, that the bank's partial performance did not take the
agreement outside the Statute of Frauds because Gibbons had an
action at law for damages against the bank.2°
Illinois appellate courts also decided contractual remedies cases
concerning other issues. In Midland Hotel Corp. v. Reuben H.
Donnelley Corp.,2° the Appellate Coui for the First District held
that in order for the plaintiff in a breach of contract action to recover lost profits, such lost profits must have been reasonably contemplated by the breaching party at the time the contract was
entered.20 6 At trial, the evidence indicated that the defendant,
Donnelley, agreed to list the plaintiff, Midland Hotel, in the de20 7
fendant's Chicago Visitors Guide and Downtown Directory.
The plaintiff brought a breach of contract action when the defendant failed to include the plaintiff in the directory. The trial court
198. Id. at 940-41, 507 N.E.2d at 532.
199. Id. at 941, 507 N.-.2d at 532.
200. 149 Ill. App. 3d 411, 500 N.E.2d 965 (5th Dist. IV66), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 118 Ill. 2d 306, 515 N.E.2d 61 (1987) (affirmin-, tLh appellate court's holding that
lost profits damages were not proven with reasonable certainty and reversing the appellate court's holding that the trial court improperly refused a jury instruction patterned
after Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)).
201. Id. at 416-17, 500 N.E.2d at 969.
202. Id. at 412, 500 N.E.2d at 966.
203. Id. at 415, 500 N.E.2d at 968.
204. Id. at 416-17, 500 N.E.2d at 969.
205. 149 111. App. 3d 5 , 501 N.E.2d 1280 (1st Dist. 1986).
206. Id. at 63-65, 501 IN.E.2d 1287-88.
207. Id. at 56, 501 N.E.2d at 1282.
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refused a jury instruction proposed by the defendant that stated
that the plaintiff was entitled to only those lost profits that were
"reasonably within contemplation of the defaulting party at the
time the contract was entered [into]. ' 20 8 The trial court awarded
the plaintiff $500,000 in actual damages based on lost profits. 2°
The appellate court reversed and remanded the case to the lower
court, stating that Illinois courts follow the common law rule that
lost profits must have been within the contemplation of the parties
at the time the contract was executed in order to be recoverable in
a breach of contract action. 210 The Midland court implied that the
trial court erred by equating contract damages with tort damages,
which include liability for all injuries proximately caused by the
tort. 21' The court explained that exposure to damages in breach of
contract actions is less than in tort actions because "a contracting
party contemplating damages that flow from special circumstances
can prepare itself for any additional risk by charging more, or get2 12
ting insurance, or even deciding to forego the entire contract.
In Biehl v. At 'ood,213 the Appellate Court for the Fifth District
considered for the first time in Illinois whether a buyer's contractual obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price set in a
contract for deed merges into the deed. The court held that a deed
transfer in connection with the execution of a land sale installment
contract does not merge the contract into the deed for purposes of
installment payments when the circumstances surrounding the
transaction indicate that the installment payments are to continue
after the deed is delivered.214
Pursuant to a written contract, the Biehls sold thirty-seven acres
of land to the defendants, Atwoods, for $85,000, payable in annual
installments of two thousand dollars each. The Biehls delivered
the deed to the Atwoods the day after the contract was executed. 21 5
The defendant Mr. Atwood, then divorced, made payments for six
years until Mr. Beihl died. The executor of Mr. Beihl's estate sued
to recover the amount due under the installment contract when the
defendant ceased making payments. 6
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 63, 501 N.E.2d at 1286-87.
Id. at 55-56, 501 N.E.2d at 1282.
Id. at 63-65, 501 N.E.2d at 1287-88.
Id. at 64, 501 N.E.2d at 1287.
Id.
151 Ill.
App. 3d 763, 502 N.E.2d 1234 (5th Dist. 1986).
Id. at 766, 502 N.E.2d at 1236.
Id. at 764, 502 N.E.2d at 1235.
Id. at 765, 502 N.E.2d at 1236.
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The appellate court noted the general rule that delivery of a deed
in full execution of a contract for sale of land merges the provisions
of the contract into the deed.2t7 A buyer's continued payment of
installments, however, is strong, if not conclusive, evidence that
the parties do not intend the execution and delivery of the deed to

cancel the installment contract.218
VI.

CONSUMER PROTECTION 21 9

In the area of consumer protection law, the Illinois Supreme
Court decided cases concerning the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act 220 and the privity requirement under an
implied warranty theory. In CharlesHester Enterprises,Inc. v. Illinois Founders Insurance Co., the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
several challenges to a "sleep-safe" insurance clause that provided
insureds with coverage in excess of the statutory limit on liability
22
in exchange for higher premiums. '
In Hester, the defendant, Illinois Founders, insured the plainriff
dramshop owner, Charles Hester, against personal injury claims by
his guests. 222 The plaintiff sought the. imposition of a constructive
trust on the premiums paid for coverage in excess of the statutory
cap on liability.223 The plaintiff contended that the promise of coverage in excess of statutory liability limits was illusory.224
Given possible legislative action raising the liability limit, the
court concluded that the insurer's promise was conditional, not il217. Id. at 765, 502 N.E.2d at 1235.
218. Id. at 766, 502 N.E.2d at 1236.

219. In Kindred v. Stuhr, 155 I1. App. 3d 194, 507 N.E.2d 1379 (3d Dist. 1987), the
Appellate Court for the Third District held that a motel was not a dwelling for the
purposes of the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act ("the Act"). Id. at 196, 507
N.E.2d at 1381. The Act allocates the risk of loss between vendors and purchasers and

requires certain disclosures. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 29, para. 8.1-8.22 (1985). Section 8.22
of the Act provides that any installment contract for the sale of a dwelling structure is

voidable at the election of buyers, unless a certificate of compliance or express written
warranty of compliance with the applicable dwelling code is provided. See ILL. REV.
STAT.

220.

ch. 29, paras. 8.21(b), 8.22 (1985).
ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 121 1/2, para. 261-272 (1985). The purpose of the act is to

protect consumers, borrowers, and businessmen against fraud, unfair methods of competition, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce
and to give the Attorney General certain powers and duties for the enforcement thereof.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 261 comment (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).

221. 114 Ill. 2d 278, 499 N.E.2d 1319 (1986). According to the court, a sleep-safe
clause is a promise by the insurer to insure against possible increases in statutory liability.
Id. at 286, 499 N.E.2d at 1322.
222. Id. at 283-84, 499 N.E.2d at 1321.
223. Id. at 282, 499 N,E.2d at 1320.
224. Id. at 287, 499 N.E.2d at 1323.
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lusory. 221 The court rejected the plaintiff's fraud claim on the
grounds that the insurance had some value and that defendants
had not been charged with misrepresenting the terms of coverage.226 The court's conclusion that the insurers did not violate the
Consumer Fraud Act followed from this holding. 27 In addition,
the court reasoned that the insurer's failure to disclose the liability
limit in its insurance policies did not constitute "concealment, suppression or omission of any material fact" in violation of the Conbecause the limits were set out clearly in the
sumer Fraud Act
2 28
Dramshop Act.
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Hester was premature.
The court, by affirming the dismissal of the complaint, gave the
plaintiff no opportunity to show, for example, that the insurer had
vastly superior bargaining power or that the insurer may have
owed dramshop owners a duty to disclose the statutory liability
limits. Courts should not be too quick to apply Hester to dismiss
similar actions before the plaintiff has had an opportunity to take
discovery.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Lanier v. Associates Finance,
Inc. 229 analyzed another alleged violation of the Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The court held that a
lender's mere mention, without explanation, of the so-called "Rule
of 78's" in a credit agreement did not violate any duty owed to
borrowers under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act or the common law. 3°
In Lanier, the plaintiff, Lanier, entered into a loan agreement
with the defendant, Associates Finance. 231 The agreement provided in relevant part that earned interest on the borrower's accelerated payment would be calculated according to the Rule of
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id. at 290, 499 N.E.2d at 1324.
Id. at 292, 499 N.E.2d at 1325.
Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 262 (1983)).
114 Ill. 2d 1, 499 N.E.2d 440 (1986).
Id. at 9-18, 499 N.E.2d at 443-47. The Rule of 78's is a method of computing

interest for a loan, in which the borrower pays more of the interest in the first payments
than he does in later payments. Id. at 6-7, 499 N.E.2d at 442. For example in a 12month loan, the borrower will pay 12/78 of the total finance charge in his first monthly
payment, and will pay 11/78 of the total finance charge in his second monthly payment.
Id. at 6, 499 N.E.2d at 442. In each succeeding month of the 12 month period, the
amount of the total finance charge is reduced by 1/78 of the total, until only 1/78 remains to be paid in the last payment. Id. Thus, the financier recovers most of the finance
charge in the first months. For a discussion of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, see supra note 220.
231. Id. at 5, 499 N.E.2d at 441.
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78 s;232 the contract did not define the Rule of 78's.233 The plaintiff
instituted a class action and sought to recover the difference in recoverable unearned interest as calculated by the actuarial method
as compared to the Rule of 78's method.234 The plaintiff alleged
that use of the Rule of 78's, absent explanation, was fraudulent and
violative of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices
Act.

23 5

The Illinois Supreme Court first rejected the plaintiff's attempt
to modify the loan agreement on the ground that there was no
meeting of the minds because of the complexity and obtuseness of
the Rule of 78's method.236 It concluded that the reference to the
Rule of 78's method in the credit agreement was not ambiguous
and refused to reform the agreement simply because the plaintiff
failed to understand how the method operated.231 The court stated
that the Federal Truth in Lending Act required issuers of consumer credit to make certain disclosures in credit agreements, including disclosure of the yearly cost of credit or "annual
percentage rate" of interest. 238 The court relied on the Federal Reserve Board's interpretation of the Federal Truth in Lending Act
to support its finding that simple reference to use of the Rule of
78's in prepayment interest calculations was sufficient disclosure
and to require otherwise would result in information overload.2 39
According to the court, mere reference to the use of the Rule of
78's was not violative of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, because the defendant complied with the federal statute.24 Section 10(b)(l) of the Consumer Fraud Act states
that the Act does not apply to actions specifically authorized by
State or federal regulatory agencies; thus, compliance with the
Federal Truth in Lending Act and the Federal Reserve Board's
interpretation of its regulations was a complete defense.
232. Id. at 5-6, 499 N.E.2d at 441.42. For an explanation of the Rule of 78's, see
supra note 230.
233. Id. at 8, 499 N.E.2d at 443.
234. Id. at 4-6, 499 N.E.2d at 443. The actuarial method is another method for computing interest in which the interest attributed to each month bears a direct relation to
the amount of money held by the borrower and the time for which that amount is held.
Id. at 7, 499 N.E.2d at 445.
235. Id. at 4-5, 499 N.E.2d at 441.
236. Id. at 8-9, 499 N.E.2d at 443 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1700 (1982)). The trial
court dismissed the action, and the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 5, 499 N.E.2d at 441.
237. Id. at 8-9, 499 N.E.2d at 443.
238. Id. at 9-11, 499 N.E.2d at 443-44.
239. Id. at 14, 499 N.E.2d at 445-46.
240. Id. at 17-18, 499 N.E.2d at 447.
241. Id.
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The Illinois Supreme Court, in Szajna v. General Motors
Corp.,242 considered whether the privity requirement in an implied
warranty breach action should be abolished. The court refused to
enlarge the scope of implied warranty actions, holding that the action was properly dismissed because the plaintiff was not in privity
with the defendant.243
In Szajna, the plaintiff, Szajna, purchased a 1976 Pontiac Ventura manufactured by the defendant, General Motors. At the time
of purchase, Szajna did not know that the car was equipped with a
Chevrolet Chevette transmission. He subsequently learned of this
fact when he experienced problems with the transmission.2 "
Szajna brought a class action seeking damages for the economic
loss from the allegedly inferior transmission, claiming breach of
implied and express warranties under both the U.C.C. and the federal Magnuson-Moss Act, breach of express warranty under the
U.C.C., and common law fraud.245
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the U.C.C.
implied warranty action on the ground that Szajna was not in privity with General Motors. 246 The court refused to follow other jurisdictions that had abolished the privity requirement for implied
warranty actions. 247 The court stated that the legislature's intent
to limit economic loss actions to contracting parties was clear by
its choice of the most restrictive scope of implied warranty provision suggested by U.C.C. drafters.248
242. 115 Ill. 2d 294, 503 N.E.2d 760 (1986).
243. Id. at 311, 503 N.E.2d at 767.
244. Id. at 299, 503 N.E.2d at 762.
245. Id. at 298, 503 N.E.2d at 761.
246. Id. at 311, 503 N.E.2d at 767. The trial court granted General Motors' motion
to dismiss; the appellate court affirmed the lower court. Id. at 298, 503 N.E.2d at 761.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the express warranty claims for lack
of privity, in addition to the implied warranty claims. Id. at 319-20, 503 N.E.2d at 771.
In affirming the dismissal of the common law fraud claim, the court stated that the use of
the Ventura name as the description of the vehicle did not constitute an untrue statement
capable of supplying an inference of intent to deceive about the transmission. Id. at 323,
503 N.E.2d at 773. The court remanded the Magnuson-Moss implied warranty claim for
further proceedings. Id. at 315, 503 N.E.2d at 769. In its analysis of the Magnuson-Moss
Act claim, the court found that sufficient privity for an implied warranty action under the
Act existed for implied warranties arising under state law. Id. at 315, 503 N.E.2d at 766.
The court based this finding on the ground that the written warranty supplied by the
buyer was sufficient under the Act to find privity. Id. at 315, 503 N.E.2d at 769.
247. Id. at 311, 503 N.E.2d at 767.
248. Id. at 307, 503 N.E.2d at 766.
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VII.

RECENT LEGISLATION

A. CorporationsLegislation
The Business Corporation Act of 1983 incorporated one minor
change during the Survey year. 249 The provision, section 2.35, provides that boards of directors for residential cooperative corporations of at least twenty-four units in a city of more than one million
inhabitants must give notice of meetings and allow residents to
attend.25 o
B. Secured TransactionsLegislation
Changes were also made to the U.C.C. during the Survey year.25'
Section 9-307(4) was amended to provide that buyers of farm products take the property subject to a security interest on the following
conditions: first, the buyer received written notice from the secured
party within one year prior to the sale; or second, if the buyer
failed to perform the payment obligations. 252 This replaces the previous language of the section which provided that a buyer took free
of security interests if he purchased the farm products in the ordinary course of business without notice of the security interest.2
Additionally, section 9-307.1 of the U.C.C. has been amended to
provide that a commission merchant or selling agent who sells a
farm product for others is subject to security interests created by
the seller of the farm products, if, within one year before the sale,
the buyer had written notice from the seller and if the commission
merchant or selling agent failed to perform the payment obligations.25 4 This section replaces the previous one which provided
that a commission merchant or selling agent was not liable unless
he had notice of the security interest within five years prior to the
sale.255
C. Banks and Banking Legislation
Changes were made also to the Illinois Banking Act (the
"Act"). 2 6 First, section 15(9)(f) has been added and provides that
when a change in the ownership of the outstanding stock of a state
249. ILL.
250. ILL.

REV. STAT.
REV. STAT.

ch. 32, paras. 1.01-17.05 (1985).
ch. 32, para. 2.35 (Supp. 1986).

251.
252.

REV. STAT.
REV. STAT.

ch. 26, paras. 9-307(4), 9-307.1 (Supp. 1986).
ch. 26, para. 9-307(4) (Supp. 1986).

REV. STAT.

ch. 26, para. 9-307(4) (1985).

253.
254.
255.
256.

ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.

REV. STAT. ch. 26, para. 9-307.1 (Supp. 1986).
REV. STAT. oh. 26, para. 9-307.1 (1985).
REV. STAT. oh. 17 paras. 301-394 (1985).
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bank results in a change of the control of the bank and the conditions discussed below result, the person that acquired forty-one
percent ownership or holding may merge the state bank with another state bank or with a national bank owned or controlled by
the same person.257 The controlling conditions are the following:

1) the change occurs after January 1, 1985; 2) the change results in
ownership or holding of outstanding stock of at least fifty-one percent by a person; and 3) the Commissioner has made a written
finding directed to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System that factual circumstances exist permitting expedited approval of acquisition by the Federal Reserve or the Commissioner
28
has made findings pursuant to section 31(1) or (2) of this Act.
The changes became effective January 20, 1987.259

Additionally, section 47 of the Act was amended to require
quarterly bank statements within thirty days rather than the previous twenty-eight day limitation. 260 Also, the previous one hundred
dollars per day late fee was abrogated. 26' Further, a new provision
now requires evidence to be submitted to the Commissioner that
the quarterly report was published, and noncompliance involves a
penalty of one hundred dollars per day.26 2
Finally, section 48 of the Act was amended to raise the annual
fee required of banks for the administration of the act from four
hundred dollars to eight hundred dollars and also to raise the
schedule for the variable fee dependant on banks' assets.26 3 The
amendment included a penalty fee for noncompliance with reporting requirements.2 4
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The changes in Commercial Law during the Survey year noted

in this Article are important because they reflect various trends in
the approach of Illinois courts toward issues that often confront
practitioners in this area.

257.

Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 17, para. 338 (Supp. 1987).
259. Id.
260. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, para. 358 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Pub. A. No. 85-10, 1987 Il. Legis Serv. 21 (West) (to be codified at ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 17, para. 359).
264. Id.
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